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In 1997, two self-certified key exchange protocols were proposed by Saeednia. It is shown that Saeednia's self-certified key exchange protocols are insecure in that an adversary may impersonate any legitimate user in key exchange. An improvcment against the impersonation attack is described.
Intvoduction: Saeednia [ 11 presented two key exchange protocols based on Girault's self-certified public key system [2] . In Saeednia's key exchange protocols, there exists a trusted third party (TTP) for system setup and user registration; however, the TTP does not know the secret key of any user during user registration. Saeednia's key exchange protocols preserve the merits inherent in both the identity-based system and the self-certified system, and hence allow a considerable reduction in communication complexity. In this Letter, we first show that Saeednia's self-certified key exchange protocols are insecure. An adversary may impersonate any legitimate user in running these protocols. We also present an improvement that can withstand the impersonation attack.
Saeednia's key exchange protocol:
In the setup of this system, the TTP chooses an integer n as the product of two large distinct primes p and q of almost the same sue, such that p = 2p' + 1 and 
XI,).
(iii) The TTP computes w, = y,"~-' mod n as a witness and sends {I,, lV,} to U;. (iv) U; verifies the identity and the witness by checking that yz = w / ( I r J mod n. Saeednia claimed that forging a valid witness w, for U, is equivalent to breaking an instance of the RSA cryptosystem [3] . Suppose that U, and want to exchange a secret key to be used for secure communication. They can perform the following protocols. These protocols are based on the well-known Diffie-Hellman key distribution system [4] . Note that the secret key exchanged in protocol 1 is invariant, while it is time-variant in protocol 2. (ii) U, sends {I,, w,} to U, = g'i mod n and gives it to the TTP.
Note that the secret key shared between U, and can be regarded as
Attack on Saeedniu's key exchange protocols: Consider the case that an adversary pretends to ;act as U, and tries to exchange a secret key with U, such that C: will indeed share the secret key with U,. First of all, the adversary randomly chooses an integer a E Z,. Then he sets x: = a . f(IJ as a fake secret key for 0: and replaces U's original public key yr (maintained by the TTP) with y: = g'~ mod n. Thereafter, the adversary can easily compute a valid witness w: = mod n for q, since the substituted public key y: = g"fclJ = w:'(TzJ (mod n) is also self-certified. In protocol 1, if the adversary sends {Iz, w:} 1. 0 U, in step (i) and intercepts the message { J , w,} that is intended to be sent to U, in step (ii), both the adversary and q will share the same secret key k' = I V '~~~~) xi = (mod n). Moreover, U, will believe that he indeed communicates with U,, because the pair b:, 14,:) will be authenticated successfully. It can be seen that protocol 2 is also vulnerable to such an attack.
Our improvement: The weakness of Saeednia's key exchange protocols is that the witness w, computed by the TTP is not self-certified, although to forge a valid w, is equivalent to breaking an instance of the RSA cryptosystem. We can easily remove this weakness by replacing step (iii) of the user registration phase with (iii*) The TTP computes w, = (y! -IDJTD~ ' mod n as a witness and sends {Z,, w,} to U,.
Our improvement only requires one more subtraction than the original step. Note that yz = g l = (y"~ + IDz) (mod n). This implies that, without knowing x,, any adversary can easily compute an authenticated pair (w,, yJ for U, satisfying the check in step (iv) of the user registration phase. However, the adversary still does not know U's secret k:ey x, unless he can solve the problem of computing discrete logarithm modulo a large composite [5, 61. Since x, is unknown, the adversary cannot pretend to act as U, to share a secret key with q. That is, in steps (iii) and (iv) of protocols 1 and 2, the adversary artd U, cannot obtain the same secret key. Introduction: Today, there is a worldwide trend towards increasing the data rate in fibre optic TDM systems from 10 to 40Gbitis (c.f.
IEE 1998
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[l]). A severe bottleneck in the electronics of such a system is the modulator driver on the transmitting side. This is because of the contradicting demands on high voltage swing and high operating speed [%I. Electroabsorption modulators (EAM) need a lower voltage swing compared to Mach-Zehnder interferometers (MZI) and may, therefore, be more suitable to be driven by monolithic integrated circuits (rather then by expensive hybrid amplifiers). However, one disadvantage, the EAM represents a capacitive load, in contrast to the 50R input of an MZI. As a consequence, at 40Gbitis it would be extremely difficult to drive the modulator via a 5O.Q transmission line. In this case, due to insufficient matching, double-reflections would occur whi'ch increase time jitter. To solve these problems, we preferred (in contrast to the usual practice) to bond the driver outputs directly to .the EAM chip. High-speed performance is further improved and mounting costs are reduced by implementing the (low-ohmic) load resistors as well as the EAM biasing on the driver chip.
Promising results at 30Gbitis have been published for ICs in III-V compound semiconductors which show single-ended voltage swings of 2.2Vp, [3, 41 , while in the presentation corresponding to [4] , even 40Gbit/s at 2.9V,,, swing is claimed. However, all these results were achieved for on-chip measurements only. Moreover, capacitive loading by an EAM and the resulting problems, mentioned above, are not considered.
To reliably achieve 40Gbitis with the SiGe bipolar technology available here, we must reduce the voltage swing at the driver output. For this, a symmetrical EAM configuration was used which can be driven by differential signalls with a voltage swing of 2V,, (2 x 1VPP). Fig. 1 shows the circuit concept of the driver IC, which consists of two current switches (CS1, CS2) each driven by three emitter follower (EF) pairs, as in our previously published designs [2, 51. However, due to the direct coupling of driver and EAM chip, the output stage must now be much more sophisticated.
First, the output current switch (CS2) is extended to a cascode configuration by a grounded-base stage (GBS), which mitigates potential breakdown problems of the output transistors and, moreover, slightly increases operating speed. Owing to the strong capacitive loading by the EAM, the output time constant must be reduced by low output resistances (nominal R, = 25.Q), requiring a high switching current in the output stage (nomnal AI = 40mA). For generating the EAM bias, the output resistors are connected to cascaded EFs (EF1, EF2). The bias voltage V,,,, equals the
